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ABSTRACT 
We apply dynamic probit models allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous initial 
conditions to IT-SILC data to investigate the low income persistence of households with disabled 
members. We find that their probability of being in a low income state is higher when compared 
with households without disabled members. In both cases household head‟s characteristics, as 
employment status and education, contribute to determine low income positions. Our results also 
support the hypothesis of endogenous initial conditions. Both unobserved heterogeneity and state 
dependence are important to determine low income positions. Our findings suggest that a structural 
intervention geared at lifting households out of low income in future requires to get them out of low 
income at present. Moreover, preventing rather than rescuing actions are preferable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disability has been coming to the forefront of Governments‟ and international organizations interest 
in the latest 10  years. 2003 was named by the EU as the European Year of People with Disabilities, 
and in October 2003 the European Disability Action Plan (2003-2010) was launched, with the 
objective of enhancing the employment of disabled persons, of “mainstreaming disability issues 
across all EU policies, legislation and programmes, taking into account their design, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation”, and of improving accessibility. The United Nations  
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was voted on December 6, 2006, with the  
ultimate objective to „boost equal opportunities for people with  disabilities‟ so as to create a 
„sustainable dynamic for the full inclusion of people with disabilities into society”. In all these 
documents the fundamental rights of living a not deprived life for disabled people is mentioned, 
with respect  to income, social life, and participation in community life.  
Despite the widespread interest on disability, not much is known about how disability affects the 
conditions of households with disabled persons (HHD), either in terms of multidimensional 
inclusion into society, or in financial terms; in particular, whether HHD are at a higher risk of 
poverty than households with not disabled persons (HHND). The limited literature on the subject 
indicates special situations with respect to poverty among HHD compared with HHND (Fremstad 
(2009), Parodi and Sciulli (2008), She and Livermore (2007and 2009), Tibble (2005). However, one 
aspect which has been overlooked by this literature is the comparative poverty persistence of the 
two groups.  
The literature may differ according to the definition of persistence
3
 adopted. In this context we refer 
to Cappellari and Jenkins (2002a and 2002b), Jenkins (2000),  Poggi (2007), Whelan and Layte and 
Maitre (2001), Trivellato and Giraldo and Rettore (2002). Here we investigate persistence 
estimating whether the probability of low income
4
 in one period is affected by low income in the 
previous period
5
. The analysis of  persistence is important for its policy implications. If the results 
of the analysis show that the probability of having a low income is mainly explained by structural 
factors, i.e. idiosyncratic characteristics, environmental/educational factors, and that past history of 
low income is irrelevant (either hardly significant or significant but very small), then policy 
                                                          
3
 Income mobility is not quite specular to persistence. Indexes are constructed to measure persistency and income 
mobility. 
4
 Low income is here defined in terms of equivalent income belonging to the first three deciles.  
5
 Note that in what follows history goes back one step only. Probably, should more steps be taken into account, the 
explicative power of past history would be enhanced. 
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implications suggest to work on structural characteristics, i.e. to improve education, work 
opportunities, environment. If however past history of low income, i.e. the lag dependent variable 
included among controls (state dependence), is significant and relevant in magnitude then policy 
implications are very different: a massive effort has to be made in order to lift the individual out of 
low income, as the very fact of being  in low income increases the probability of low income the 
following period. The policy recommended by these findings suggest money transfers and/or 
provision of consumption goods
6
 sufficient to get the individual out of low income.  
However, this conclusion based on the role of persistency in explaining the probability of 
being in low income has to be drawn with much caution. In fact, even though money transfer 
temporarily lifts the individual out of low income, it could be ineffective in the medium-long term 
to fight poverty status. Specifically, if money transfers leave unchanged structural characteristics 
determining low income positions, they  would be needed repeatedly, in each period, in order to 
keep the individual out of low income, and they can be interpreted as compensation for the lack of 
suitable structural characteristics.   
In purely efficiency terms, repeated money transfers or transformations of the initial 
conditions would be indifferent to society as instruments to lift individuals out of low income, 
under the condition that the present value of the flow of money transfers equals the present value of 
the flow of costs needed to alter the structural characteristics. Of course the amount of money 
transfers necessary each period to keep individuals out of low income depends on the shape of the 
income distribution, i.e. on the level and frequency of low incomes. Conversely, the cost of 
intervention on structural characteristics depends on the distribution of the structural characteristics 
themselves, i.e. on the level and frequency of the characteristics below the levels needed to lift the 
individual out of low income
7
. The problems just outlined are interesting from a methodological 
point of view, and become crucial when comparing the probability of low income for different 
groups, in order to investigate the factors which determine low income, and the consequent policy 
recommendations.  
                                                          
6
 In this case very special attention ought to be paid to the different consumption and service needs of HHD and HHND. 
Even though this topic has been little investigated, on the specific consumption specifications of HHD see Tibble 
(2002), Zaidi and Burchardt (2003) 
7
 The conclusion would be different if we studied social exclusion in terms of durable goods, such as for instance 
housing. An estimated persistence in terms of the lagged variable “quality of housing” would recommend the policy of 
providing the individual with a good house, as this once and for all the intervention would lift the individual out of 
social exclusion in terms of poor housing. 
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This paper develops a dynamic approach to estimate the factors which affect the probability 
of being in low income separately for households with and without members with disabled people, 
with special focus on the role of persistence. Specifically, our benchmark model consists in a 
dynamic probit model taking into account unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence. 
Econometric analysis is based on the longitudinal section of the IT-SILC database for the period 
2004-2007. IT-SILC allows us to identify disabled  people on the basis of self-reported information 
about limitation in activities because of health problems. For robustness purposes alternative 
definitions of disability, according to the seriousness and the time of activity limitations, are 
considered.  
According to our estimation results, whatever model is used, low income position is strongly 
dependent on the previous low income status, even though not taking into account the initial 
condition problem seriously overestimates the state dependence parameter. In this context, HHD, 
compared with HHND, are more likely to be in low income positions and experience a stronger 
persistence in that state, i.e. they have a greater difficulty in  leaving low income status once they 
are there. As anticipated this has policy implications. When significant, familiar and head 
characteristics quite similarly affect the probability of being in low income positions of HHD and 
HHND, with the exception of education, employment and marital status of household heads. Policy 
implications of our findings are discussed in the last paragraph. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides 
the empirical specification, while Section 4 presents the results of the econometric analysis. Finally, 
conclusions and policy implications follow in Section 5. 
 
 
DATA 
Two concepts need clarification before moving forward, the first concerns the definition of 
disability, the second concerns the definition of persistence of low income. 
The definition of disability can be tackled from several angles: the first one is based on the 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF, WHO, 2001), which 
identifies the social or inclusive model of disability, based on the capability approach. In this 
respect disabled is the person whose autonomy is limited because of the characteristics of the 
context where she lives and operates (this is the approach advocated by the European Disability 
Forum). An alternative approach is the strictly institutional one, according to which disabled are 
considered the people whom the institutional system has certified as such, and who receive some 
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kind of disability benefits. A third approach is the self referential one, according to which disabled 
is the person who considers herself as such when answering specific questions about health, often 
referring to limitations encountered in daily activities. The three definitions have all pros and cons: 
in particular the second one is open to bias determined by fraud, or by governmental choice of using 
disability benefits as an instrument of financial support to poor people; the third is contingent on the 
possible bias linked to self assessment, but also is flexible enough to accommodate for different 
individual perceptions to given limitations. Consequently, the choice of using data collected 
according to each system introduces some bias in the investigation; the EU-SILC data which are 
suitable for our investigation have not a specific question to identify disability, therefore we infer  a 
definition of disability  from how people perceive their own imitations.  
A second reflection concerns the definition of low income, here identified by levels of equivalent 
income belonging to the first three deciles; the upper limit therefore coincides with 60% of the 
median, which identifies the poverty line according to Eurostat methodology.  
Our analysis is based on the longitudinal section of the IT-SILC dataset for the period 2004-2007. 
The IT-SILC data is the Italian component of the EU-SILC (the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions) that is an instrument aimed to provide cross-sectional and 
longitudinal information. The EU-SILC collects micro-data on income, poverty, social exclusion 
and living conditions from most of the EU countries in order to make available comparable 
information across countries. As the EU-SILC, the IT-SILC is a multi-purpose instrument mainly 
focusing on income, and devoting specific attention to detailed income components both at 
household and personal level, social exclusion, housing condition, labour, education and health.  
The IT-SILC dataset includes about 105000 individuals and about 49000 households for the whole 
period 2004-2007. However, since our dynamic analysis requires a balanced panel, we only use 
information from households present in each of the four waves of the longitudinal section. This 
selection leaves us with 4502 households. The income of households with a different number of 
components is made comparable using the modified OECD equivalent scale, for which the 
household income is normalized by an equivalent scale number (equivalent adult) that assigns 
different weights for each household component
8
. Disabled individuals, to single out households 
without disabled members from households with disabled members, are identified using  
information about limitations in activities because of health problems. This variable identifies three 
levels of limitation: no limitation, limitation and strong limitation. Moreover, the level of limitation, 
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According to the modified OECD equivalent scale used here, the equivalent adult is: ae=1+0.5*(adults-
1)+0.3*(number of components aged less than 14). The equivalent income is Yeq=Y/ae. 
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even though quite stable across years, may change overtime. Given these introductions we define 
the HHD for the whole period under investigation, as the household in which at least one  member 
reports at least two years of strong limitations in activities and at least one year of limitation in 
activities. Other households are defined without disabled members (HHND). Table 1 reports the 
number of households by combination of level of limitation across years, and identifies HHD. 
 
Table 1. Identification of HHD and HHND 
0 1 2 3 4
0 1804 620 339 255 123
1 112 105 153 114 -
2 51 79 124 - -
3 46 140 - - -
4 137 - - - -
Number of years with 
limitation
Weak Limitation
Strong 
Limitation
 
Source: our elaboration on IT-SILC data 
 
This definition of disability leaves us with 640 households with disabled members and 3562 
households without disabled members
9
.  
Low income position is defined as the presence in the first three deciles of the equivalent income 
distribution. The dynamic process in the low income positions is explained in terms of household 
characteristics and of personal characteristics of the reference person. Specifically, we consider the 
area of residence, the number of household components and the presence of children aged 0-5 at 
household level, the age, gender, educational level, employment status and the marital status at 
personal level. Descriptive statistics are reported in table 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 For robustness check we also use two alternative identification of HHD. The weaker definition includes as HHD those 
households for which at least one member declare to experience at least 3 years of limitations in activities. According to 
this definition we identify 1171 HHD and 3031 HHND. The stronger definition identifies HHD by the presence of at 
least one household member declaring four years of limitations in activities (two of which strong limitations). 
According to this definition we identify 401 HHD and 3801 HHND. Estimation results obtained from these alternative 
definitions are presented in the appendix. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Covariates Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Low income position 0.355 0.479 0.290 0.454
Age 16-29 0.063 0.242 0.133 0.339
Age 30-44 0.094 0.292 0.307 0.461
Age 45-60 0.164 0.371 0.266 0.442
Age over 60 0.680 0.467 0.295 0.456
Male 0.445 0.497 0.499 0.500
Maximum low education 0.772 0.420 0.552 0.497
Secondary education 0.147 0.354 0.299 0.458
Minimum post-secondary education 0.052 0.221 0.135 0.342
Missing education 0.030 0.170 0.013 0.115
North 0.400 0.490 0.489 0.500
Centre 0.256 0.437 0.219 0.413
South-Islands 0.344 0.475 0.292 0.455
Employed 0.183 0.387 0.492 0.500
Partner employed 0.147 0.354 0.335 0.472
Change in disability status 0.378 0.485 0.055 0.228
Disabled in the first wave* 0.895 0.306 0.154 0.361
Married/Cohabitant 0.534 0.499 0.600 0.490
Children 0-5 0.038 0.228 0.145 0.415
HH size 2.384 1.182 2.635 1.264
Urban area* 0.269 0.444 0.320 0.467
* Initial state equation
HHD HHND
 
Source: our elaboration on IT-SILC data 
 
Table 3 shows the transition matrices across the income deciles from time t and time t+1, 
comparing the situation of HHD and HHND. Clearly, HHD experiment higher persistence in the 
departure decile, whatever it is. With respect to the situation of HHND, the persistence rate of HHD 
is particularly relevant in the second and third deciles, implying that HHD are likely to experiment 
stronger persistence in low income positions than HHND. This may also e explained by the 
presence of disabled members in those households. 
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Table 3. Transition matrices 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 64.17% 13.37% 8.56% 7.49% 2.67% 0.53% 0.53% 1.60% 1.07% 0.00%
2 13.10% 63.89% 9.92% 7.94% 2.78% 1.19% 0.40% 0.79% 0.00% 0.00%
3 8.30% 9.13% 55.19% 13.69% 7.47% 2.90% 1.66% 0.83% 0.41% 0.41%
4 7.14% 5.56% 11.11% 52.38% 10.71% 7.14% 3.57% 1.59% 0.79% 0.00%
5 3.13% 5.80% 5.80% 13.39% 50.00% 9.82% 5.80% 2.23% 3.13% 0.89%
6 0.53% 1.59% 4.23% 4.76% 15.87% 44.44% 15.34% 8.47% 3.70% 1.06%
7 1.23% 2.45% 3.07% 2.45% 6.75% 14.11% 41.10% 18.40% 6.75% 3.68%
8 0.00% 0.58% 1.73% 3.47% 4.05% 7.51% 14.45% 44.51% 17.34% 6.36%
9 0.72% 0.72% 2.16% 5.76% 1.44% 2.88% 5.76% 15.83% 52.52% 12.23%
10 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 0.00% 5.00% 1.00% 3.00% 7.00% 18.00% 63.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 61.87% 15.77% 8.34% 4.67% 3.48% 2.84% 0.73% 0.73% 0.64% 0.92%
2 16.10% 51.91% 15.49% 5.33% 5.13% 2.62% 1.01% 1.31% 0.60% 0.50%
3 7.07% 12.97% 43.61% 16.01% 8.06% 5.80% 3.34% 1.57% 1.08% 0.49%
4 5.26% 5.06% 15.87% 41.27% 14.58% 7.34% 5.26% 2.58% 1.79% 0.99%
5 3.09% 4.92% 5.60% 13.71% 38.61% 15.83% 8.30% 5.69% 2.61% 1.64%
6 2.79% 3.17% 4.10% 7.45% 14.80% 35.75% 17.32% 8.01% 4.56% 2.05%
7 1.37% 1.46% 3.01% 3.92% 6.93% 15.50% 37.10% 18.51% 7.47% 4.74%
8 1.01% 1.20% 1.47% 2.76% 4.23% 7.82% 17.39% 35.79% 19.87% 8.46%
9 1.25% 0.53% 1.16% 1.43% 1.96% 4.81% 7.66% 19.43% 42.96% 18.81%
10 1.21% 0.78% 0.95% 0.86% 1.29% 3.45% 3.54% 6.38% 18.21% 63.33%
HOUSEHOLDS WITH DISABLED MEMBERS
HOUSEHOLDS WITHOUT DISABLED MEMBERS
 
Source: our elaboration on IT-SILC data 
 
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The low income position is defined as the presence in the first three deciles of the equivalent 
household income distribution. The evolution overtime of the presence in low income positions is 
investigated by applying a dynamic probit model accounting for both unobserved heterogeneity and 
state dependence. Overall, the introduction of the lagged dependent variable among the covariates 
allows us to identify the existence and the magnitude of the persistence phenomenon in a low 
income position. Moreover, since we are interested in comparing the situation of households with 
and without disabled members we consider separately the two groups of households, and apply the 
model to each group. 
The equation for the latent dependent variable is: 
 
(1) itiititit uxyy   
'
1
*   
 
with i=1,…,N indicating the households and t=2,…,T the time periods. yit
*
 is the latent dependent 
variable and yit is the observed binary outcome variable defined as: 
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(2) 


 

else   0
0 if   1 *it
it
y
y  
 
and where xit is a vector of explanatory variables and the error terms uit are assumed to be? serially 
independent and normally distributed with zero mean and variance σu
2
. However, given the 
presence of the individual specific time invariant αi terms, the composite error term, vit= αi + σu
2
, is 
correlated over time. Specifically, equi-correlation between the vit in any two different time periods 
reads: 
 
(3)  
22
2
,
u
isit vvCorr






   t,s=2,…,T; t≠s 
 
Standard model estimation requires that initial observations (yi1) and unobserved heterogeneity (αi) 
are uncorrelated. However, the assumption of exogenous “initial conditions” is likely tnot to hold in 
case the starting point of the process governing the outcomes is not observed. If this is the case, it is 
not possible to observe whether the starting low income position of households is the result of state 
dependence or unobserved heterogeneity. To solve the initial conditions problem, taking into 
account the correlation between yi1 and αi, Heckman (1981) suggested the use of an approximation 
to the process generating the first period observations using the same form of equation as for the 
rest of the observations but with some restrictions. Specifically, the linearized reduced form 
equation for the initial value of the latent variable may be expressed as: 
 
(4) iii zy  
'
1
*
1  
 
where zi1 is a vector of exogenous instruments and ηi is correlated with αi, but uncorrelated with uit 
for t  2.  It can be written as: 
 
(5) 1iii u  
 
where θ > 0, and with uit and αi independent of one another. The linearized reduced form for the 
latent variable for the initial time period is therefore specified as: 
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(6) 1
'
1
*
1 iiii uzy    
 
where z includes period 1 values of x variables, typically together with pre sample variables as 
instruments. 
The joint probability of the observed binary sequence for individual i, given the unobserved 
heterogeneity term, is: 
 
(7)        

 
T
t
itiititiii yxyyz
2
'
11
'
1 1212   
 
It follows that the likelihood function to be maximized reads: 
 
(8)          



dFyxyyzL
i
T
t
itiititiii 

 
2
'
11
'
1 1212  
 
where F is the distribution function of  , where    1 . If α is normally distributed, 
then the integral over   can be evaluated using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature.     
 
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 4 reports the estimation results obtained by applying dynamic probit models. The first two 
columns refer to the model assuming exogenous initial conditions, while third and fourth columns 
report the estimation results of the model taking into account the possibility of endogenous initial 
conditions. We now analyze the results which are common to both HHD and HHND, and 
subsequently we bring out the differences between the two groups.  
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Table 4. Low income persistence: dynamic probit models 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Lag low income position 2.109 0.078 *** 1.896 0.034 *** 1.223 0.203 *** 1.072 0.077 ***
Age 16-29 -0.200 0.216 -0.016 0.065 -0.328 0.267 -0.022 0.087
Age 45-60 -0.086 0.169 -0.178 0.049 *** -0.231 0.225 -0.236 0.069 ***
Age over 60 -0.284 0.169 * -0.344 0.058 *** -0.379 0.220 * -0.349 0.080 ***
Male -0.158 0.079 ** -0.094 0.034 *** -0.174 0.100 * -0.116 0.045 ***
Max. low education 0.221 0.119 * 0.328 0.041 *** 0.327 0.162 ** 0.522 0.060 ***
Min. Post-secondary education -0.714 0.232 *** -0.137 0.057 ** -0.829 0.291 *** -0.167 0.077 **
Missing education -0.001 0.324 0.780 0.281 *** -0.034 0.397 0.909 0.340 ***
North 0.084 0.099 -0.047 0.044 0.129 0.161 -0.130 0.070 *
South-Islands 0.315 0.100 *** 0.373 0.046 *** 0.658 0.179 *** 0.790 0.087 ***
Employed 0.049 0.117 -0.451 0.040 *** -0.054 0.151 -0.654 0.056 ***
Partner employed -0.384 0.148 *** -0.477 0.045 *** -0.645 0.211 *** -0.711 0.064 ***
Change disability status -0.048 0.078 0.033 0.068 -0.018 0.093 0.069 0.087
Married/coabitant 0.207 0.091 ** 0.012 0.043 0.293 0.131 ** -0.016 0.063
Children 0-5 -0.277 0.216 0.229 0.046 *** -0.272 0.267 0.407 0.069 ***
Household size -0.073 0.047 -0.034 0.018 * -0.177 0.076 ** -0.072 0.027 ***
Constant -1.130 0.229 *** -0.954 0.076 *** -0.864 0.317 *** -0.860 0.111 ***
Sigma u 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.005
Rho 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.520 0.135 *** 0.507 0.047 ***
LR test of rho=0
chibar2(1) 0.000 0.001
Prob>=chibar2 1.000 0.490
Theta 1.759 0.759 ** 1.405 0.184 ***
Number of observations
Number of households
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
Log likelihood  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-700.90 3562.00 -1044.05 -5248.98
640 3562 640 3562
841.65 4157.60 191.66 1453.72
67.29 374.25
0.000 0.000
1915 10648 2560 14248
Model 1 Model 2
HHD HHND HHD HHND
 
Source: our elaboration on IT-SILC data 
 
First, we examine the estimates of persistence as a factor determining the probability of being poor:  
the estimates of the dynamic probit (model 1) shows that for both groups the probability of  being in 
low income is mainly and positively affected by low income in the previous period. This is seen by 
the positive sign, the high statistical significance and the value of the estimated coefficient of the 
delayed variable. However, the coefficient of the lagged variable is higher for HHD than for 
HHND: low income history has a stronger impact on the probability of present low income for 
HHD than for HHND.  
 The estimates of the dynamic probit which takes into account initial conditions (model 2) 
confirm the strong explanatory power of low income persistence for both groups; however, the 
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estimated coefficient of the lagged variable is smaller, and the estimated coefficients of the 
structural variables are higher in model 2 than in model 1.  
We now compare the estimates of the effects of the structural variables on the probability of 
low income for the two groups, households without and with disabled members; it is important to 
remark that almost all structural variables have the same sign for both groups. 
Two variables have an equally significant and high coefficient to explain the probability of 
low income for both group: living in the South-Islands highly increases the probability of low 
income; on the contrary, the employment of the household partner highly decreases the probability 
of low income, even though slightly less for HHD. Policy implications follow: the South-Islands are 
the areas of the country with the highest levels of diffusion and intensity of poverty, and high 
unemployment, therefore policies to improve the situation in these areas would reduce the chances 
of low income for both groups here considered. Also, the provision of caring services for young 
children and disabled people would allow the household partner to take part in some form of paid 
employment. Also the head‟s education is important to explain the probability of being in low 
income state. For both groups, with respect to the base-category, the secondary educational level, 
being less educated increases the probability of being in low income, while having more education 
decreases that probability. However, returns differ quite strongly between HHD and HHND. Being 
poorly educated is more penalizing for HHND while being highly educated is more profitable for 
HHD: definitely the return of household head‟s education is higher for HHD than for HHND. 
Finally, the household head‟s age has similar effects for both  HHD and HHND, even though 
significance does differ. 
We now comment on variables significant for one group but not for the other. The estimates 
of a group of three variables have to be interpreted together, i.e. the status of employment of the 
household head, the age of the household head. For HHD the probability of poverty is significantly 
reduced if the Household head is employed, and of central age, and both these findings are intuitive; 
however, both these variables are insignificant for HHND. The presence of small children is highly 
significant among HHND to increase the probability of being poor, but it is not significant at all for 
HHD. We can explain this in terms of the reduced opportunity to work in paid employment of the 
household head‟s partner when the spouse is needed to look after a severely disabled person. As a 
consequence, if in HHD household resources are already used to look after a severely disabled 
person, the marginal use of resources needed to look after a young child is negligible, so the impact 
of a young child on the household income is not significant for HHD. In the opposite direction, 
being married/cohabitant significantly increases the probability of being poor for HHD, and is 
13 
 
insignificant for HHND. This can be explained: if the spouse stays at home to look after the 
disabled person, a given income has to support at least two people, so increasing the probability of 
being poor. Other variables are differently significant in the two groups. The probability of low 
income is reduced with the increase in household size for HHND, for whom the economy of scale 
effect can be expected to prevail; however for HHD economies of scale appear to be less relevant, 
as they are more than countervailed by  the likely high fixed expenditures connected with the 
presence of the  disabled member. 
 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
We list the findings which we believe to be most relevant for policy implications.  
1. The probability of low income is higher for HHD. 
2. Estimated persistence is higher for HHD than for HHND; if the econometric analysis is refined to 
consider endogenous initial conditions, the coefficient estimating the persistence effect is still 
positive and significant for both groups, but the gap in the two coefficients is slightly smaller; 
persistence is important to explain low income, and more so for HHD than for HHND.  
These findings suggest that a structural intervention  geared at lifting  households out of low income 
in future requires to get them out of low income at present. Also, from the estimates we can infer 
that present low income has a bigger role in explaining the probability of low income in the future 
for HHD than for HHND. 
However, the explanatory power of persistence decreases when the initial conditions are taken into 
account, and structural variables acquire a stronger explanatory role.  
The consequent recommendation for policy is to act before the individual falls into poverty, so that 
persistence does not add its effects to keep the individual  in poverty.  
3. The variable with a strong significance in reducing poverty for HHD is the employment of the 
household‟s partner. The consequent recommendation for policy is the provision of adequate 
caring services to look after the disabled person, in order to allow the household partner to work 
in paid employment. 
4. Household size is a factor determining the reduction in the probability of low income, when 
initial conditions are taken into account; this  suggests the importance of economies of scale, and 
of sharing the tasks of caring for the disabled person, so that none of the household member has 
to give up all forms of paid employment in order to care for the disabled person. The consequent 
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recommendation for policy is the same mentioned above, i.e. provision of adequate caring 
services to allow all household members some form of paid employment. 
5. Last, among the explanatory variables, fewer are the variables significant for HHD than for 
HHND, showing that  HHD are less respondent to external circumstances. This appears  to 
indirectly confirm social exclusion of HHD, whose interaction with the world appears to be 
much less significant than for HHND. 
6. Our findings also show that preventive and rescuing policy interventions are not equally 
effective/symmetric with respect to fighting poverty; and they also recommend early 
interventions, to prevent people from falling into poverty, rather than late interventions, to lift 
poor people out of poverty. This emerges from our findings: the probability of low income is 
affected more by structural variables if we take into account the initial conditions;  therefore the 
effectiveness of policy instruments working on structural variables is stronger if the persistence 
element is not there. Once the individual is in a state of low income, policy interventions have to 
work on the structural variables, but also on the increase in the probability of low income that 
persistence creates. Therefore preventing rather than rescuing actions are recommended. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Determinants of the initial low income state: probit models 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Age 16-29 0.369 0.498 0.246 0.136 *
Age 45-60 -0.752 0.480 -0.205 0.114 *
Age over 60 -0.673 0.461 -0.231 0.135 *
Male 0.058 0.203 -0.239 0.077 ***
Max. low education 0.721 0.316 ** 0.683 0.100 ***
Min. Post-secondary education 0.358 0.586 -0.148 0.140
Missing education 1.501 0.674 ** 0.561 0.333 *
North 0.030 0.292 -0.171 0.108
South-Islands 0.704 0.337 ** 0.931 0.124 ***
Employed -0.688 0.335 ** -0.660 0.094 ***
Partner employed -0.788 0.354 ** -0.709 0.104 ***
Change disability status -0.548 0.352 0.028 0.100
Married/coabitant 0.233 0.263 0.030 0.101
Children 0-5 0.510 0.429 0.326 0.105 ***
Household size -0.343 0.152 ** -0.015 0.041
Densely populated area -0.377 0.237 -0.225 0.081 ***
Constant 0.308 0.713 -0.844 0.183 ***
HHNDHHD
 
Source: our elaboration on IT-SILC data 
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Table A2. Weak definition of disability (at least 3 years of limitations) 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Lag low income position 2.099 0.057 *** 1.853 0.037 *** 1.016 0.127 *** 1.075 0.087 ***
Age 16-29 -0.172 0.153 0.001 0.068 -0.358 0.205 * 0.015 0.090
Age 45-60 -0.235 0.119 ** -0.160 0.051 *** -0.329 0.173 * -0.208 0.070 ***
Age over 60 -0.356 0.121 *** -0.359 0.062 *** -0.391 0.173 ** -0.383 0.085 ***
Male -0.098 0.059 * -0.105 0.037 *** -0.137 0.083 * -0.128 0.047 ***
Max. low education 0.281 0.089 *** 0.321 0.043 *** 0.453 0.133 *** 0.494 0.062 ***
Min. Post-secondary education -0.535 0.157 *** -0.124 0.059 ** -0.520 0.207 ** -0.161 0.078 **
Missing education 0.174 0.250 1.175 0.460 ** 0.178 0.333 1.360 0.547 **
North -0.013 0.072 -0.031 0.048 -0.077 0.140 -0.088 0.074
South-Islands 0.302 0.074 *** 0.385 0.051 *** 0.683 0.151 *** 0.777 0.094 ***
Employed -0.165 0.083 ** -0.463 0.043 *** -0.338 0.117 *** -0.652 0.059 ***
Partner employed -0.382 0.101 *** -0.494 0.048 *** -0.730 0.146 *** -0.707 0.067 ***
Change disability status -0.006 0.062 -0.038 0.087 0.006 0.083 0.011 0.109
Married/coabitant 0.105 0.070 0.030 0.047 0.059 0.114 0.029 0.067
Children 0-5 -0.151 0.171 0.226 0.047 *** -0.080 0.217 0.380 0.068 ***
Household size -0.086 0.035 ** -0.024 0.019 -0.235 0.060 *** -0.047 0.028 *
Constant -0.961 0.162 *** -0.969 0.081 *** -0.571 0.253 ** -0.924 0.115 ***
Sigma u 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.005
Rho 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.663 0.055 *** 0.469 0.056 ***
Theta 1.156 0.183 *** 1.516 0.240 ***
Number of observations
Number of households
Log likelihood  -4432.80-1255.78 -3052.69
3031
9062 4684
1171
-1862.69
HHD HHND HHD HHND
3501
1171
12124
3031
 
Source: our elaboration on IT-SILC data 
 
Table A3. Strong definition of disability (4 years of limitations, and at least 2 of strong limitations) 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Lag low income position 2.150 0.099 *** 1.903 0.033 *** 1.202 0.283 *** 1.097 0.074 ***
Age 16-29 -0.160 0.282 -0.028 0.063 -0.330 0.377 -0.042 0.084
Age 45-60 -0.049 0.216 -0.177 0.048 *** -0.325 0.360 -0.234 0.066 ***
Age over 60 -0.253 0.217 -0.343 0.056 *** -0.427 0.350 -0.354 0.076 ***
Male -0.129 0.102 -0.100 0.033 *** -0.171 0.142 -0.122 0.042 ***
Max. low education 0.038 0.146 0.339 0.040 *** 0.122 0.221 0.523 0.058 ***
Min. Post-secondary education -0.915 0.302 *** -0.139 0.056 ** -1.450 0.466 *** -0.165 0.074 **
Missing education 0.115 0.382 0.551 0.249 ** 0.201 0.538 0.663 0.298 **
North 0.194 0.129 -0.060 0.042 0.441 0.278 -0.143 0.066 **
South-Islands 0.403 0.131 *** 0.349 0.044 *** 0.950 0.332 *** 0.735 0.082 ***
Employed 0.117 0.149 -0.438 0.040 *** 0.003 0.206 -0.626 0.054 ***
Partner employed -0.200 0.182 -0.482 0.045 *** -0.332 0.305 -0.711 0.062 ***
Change disability status 0.118 0.102 -0.061 0.057 0.153 0.133 -0.044 0.071
Married/coabitant 0.252 0.117 ** 0.019 0.041 0.384 0.201 * -0.005 0.059
Children 0-5 -0.197 0.251 0.218 0.046 *** 0.080 0.608 0.380 0.066 ***
Household size -0.089 0.061 -0.034 0.017 ** -0.193 0.104 * -0.074 0.026 ***
Constant -1.210 0.295 *** -0.946 0.074 *** -1.087 0.518 ** -0.828 0.106 ***
Sigma u 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.005
Rho 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.598 0.159 *** 0.489 0.047 ***
Theta 1.205 0.520 ** 1.505 0.203 ***
Number of observations
Number of households
Log likelihood  -5659.02
401 3801
-429.31
11364
3801
-3875.41
1604
-636.65
HHD HHND HHD HHND
1199
401
15204
 
Source: our elaboration on IT-SILC data 
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